论文标题
外部威胁，政治流失和财政能力
External Threats, Political Turnover and Fiscal Capacity
论文作者
论文摘要
在最近关于国家能力的大多数文献中，战争在国家建设中的重要性假设来自国外的威胁会在国内产生共同利益，从而导致国家能力的投资更大。但是，许多遭受外部冲突的国家并没有增加统一性。相反，他们面临经常导致破坏性内战的派系政治。本文提出了一个关于州际冲突对财政能力的影响的理论，在财政能力上，与外部威胁作斗争并不总是公共利益的公共利益，州际冲突可能导致内战。该理论确定了外部冲突风险增加的条件会减少内战的机会，这反过来导致政府具有更长的政治生活，并有更多的激励措施以财政能力进行投资。这些条件取决于机构的凝聚力，但以一种非平凡和新颖的方式：外部冲突的较高风险导致政治流动较低，但这也使外国入侵更有可能，只有在机构充分不可能的情况下才会有助于国家建设。
In most of the recent literature on state capacity, the significance of wars in state-building assumes that threats from foreign countries generate common interests among domestic groups, leading to larger investments in state capacity. However, many countries that have suffered external conflicts don't experience increased unity. Instead, they face factional politics that often lead to destructive civil wars. This paper develops a theory of the impact of interstate conflicts on fiscal capacity in which fighting an external threat is not always a common-interest public good, and in which interstate conflicts can lead to civil wars. The theory identifies conditions under which an increased risk of external conflict decreases the chance of civil war, which in turn results in a government with a longer political life and with more incentives to invest in fiscal capacity. These conditions depend on the cohesiveness of institutions, but in a non-trivial and novel way: a higher risk of an external conflict that results in lower political turnover, but that also makes a foreign invasion more likely, contributes to state-building only if institutions are sufficiently incohesive.
