论文标题
小组级别的选择避免了公地的悲剧
Group-level selection avoids the tragedy of the commons
论文作者
论文摘要
公共物品游戏是一个著名的例子，说明了下议院的悲剧。在这个游戏中，合作的个人为一个游泳池做出了贡献，该游泳池又分发给了该小组的所有成员，包括在没有做出贡献的情况下获得与合作者相同回报的叛逃者。现在的问题是，如何激励小组成员在最大化共同利益的情况下合作。虽然昂贵的惩罚提出了一种这样的方法，但惩罚的成本仍然降低了共同利益。在这里，我们展示了小组级的选择如何成为一种激励，特别是，即使是小组选择的分数，也可以克服缺陷的收益。此外，我们展示了惩罚和群体水平的选择如何相互作用。这项工作表明，与基本收入相似的重新分配与整个团体的经济成功相关，可以克服公地的悲剧。
The public goods game is a famous example illustrating the tragedy of the commons. In this game cooperating individuals contribute to a pool, which in turn is distributed to all members of the group, including defectors who reap the same rewards as cooperators without having made a contribution before. The question is now, how to incentivize group members to all cooperate as it maximizes the common good. While costly punishment presents one such method, the cost of punishment still reduces the common good. Here we show how group-level selection can be such an incentive, and specifically how even fractions of group-level selection can overcome the benefits defectors receive. Further, we show how punishment and group-level selection interact. This work suggests that a redistribution similar to a basic income that is coupled to the economic success of the entire group could overcome the tragedy of the commons.
