论文标题
信息验证了先验：贝叶斯更新和应用程序的定理
Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications
论文作者
论文摘要
我们对具有异源先验的贝叶斯人的预期后期有结果，称为信息验证了先验（IVP）。在熟悉的订购要求下，安妮（Anne）期望（布莱克韦尔（Blackwell）更具信息丰富的实验，使鲍勃的后部平均接近安妮先前的均值。我们将结果应用于不对称信息游戏的两种情况：自愿测试或认证以及昂贵的信号或伪造。 IVP可用于确定代理的行为如何响应其他外源性或内源性信息。我们讨论经济影响。
We develop a result on expected posteriors for Bayesians with heterogenous priors, dubbed information validates the prior (IVP). Under familiar ordering requirements, Anne expects a (Blackwell) more informative experiment to bring Bob's posterior mean closer to Anne's prior mean. We apply the result in two contexts of games of asymmetric information: voluntary testing or certification, and costly signaling or falsification. IVP can be used to determine how an agent's behavior responds to additional exogenous or endogenous information. We discuss economic implications.
