论文标题
无法触摸这个：短钥匙的无条件篡改证据
Can't Touch This: unconditional tamper evidence from short keys
论文作者
论文摘要
使用信息理论安全性将数据存储在外部服务器上，而使用比数据本身短的密钥则是不可能的。作为替代方案，我们提出了一项方案，该方案可以实现理论上安全的篡改证据：服务器能够获取有关存储数据的信息，但在未被发现的过程中却没有获得有关存储的数据的信息。此外，客户只需要记住一个比数据短得多的键。 我们基于熵不确定性关系为我们的计划提供了安全证明，类似于QKD证明。如果爱丽丝能够（可逆地）仅用一个简短的键（可逆地）将消息随机化为几乎均匀的情况，我们的计划就可以。通过构建明确的攻击，我们表明，如果没有这种随机性，就无法实现短键无条件的篡改证据。
Storing data on an external server with information-theoretic security, while using a key shorter than the data itself, is impossible. As an alternative, we propose a scheme that achieves information-theoretically secure tamper evidence: The server is able to obtain information about the stored data, but not while staying undetected. Moreover, the client only needs to remember a key whose length is much shorter than the data. We provide a security proof for our scheme, based on an entropic uncertainty relation, similar to QKD proofs. Our scheme works if Alice is able to (reversibly) randomise the message to almost-uniformity with only a short key. By constructing an explicit attack we show that short-key unconditional tamper evidence cannot be achieved without this randomisability.
