论文标题
道德危害下的最佳评级设计
Optimal Rating Design under Moral Hazard
论文作者
论文摘要
我们检查了在存在道德危害的情况下最佳评级系统的设计。首先，一个中间人承诺评级方案。然后，一个决策者选择了为买家产生价值的动作。然后，中介观察到决策者选择的嘈杂信号，并向买方发送与评级方案一致的信号。在这里，我们充分表征了在任何任意评级系统下都可以在平衡中产生的一组分配。我们使用这种表征来研究最佳评级系统的各个设计方面。具体而言，当决策者的努力富有成效时，以及决策者可以用噪音操纵中介信号时，我们研究最佳评分的特性。通过操纵，评级不确定性是最佳评分系统的相当强大的功能。
We examine the design of optimal rating systems in the presence of moral hazard. First, an intermediary commits to a rating scheme. Then, a decision-maker chooses an action that generates value for the buyer. The intermediary then observes a noisy signal of the decision-maker's choice and sends the buyer a signal consistent with the rating scheme. Here we fully characterize the set of allocations that can arise in equilibrium under any arbitrary rating system. We use this characterization to study various design aspects of optimal rating systems. Specifically, we study the properties of optimal ratings when the decision-maker's effort is productive and when the decision-maker can manipulate the intermediary's signal with a noise. With manipulation, rating uncertainty is a fairly robust feature of optimal rating systems.
