论文标题
预测市场的及时信息
Timely Information from Prediction Markets
论文作者
论文摘要
预测市场是从战略代理商中引起和汇总信念的强大工具。但是，在当前的预测市场中，代理商可能会通过竞争成为第一个更新市场的人来耗尽社会福利。我们启动对信息汇总的速度和信息成本的速度之间的权衡研究。我们设计市场以汇总及时的信息，从战略代理人最大化社会福利。为此，市场必须激励代理商投入正确的努力来获取信息：足够迅速以至于有用，但不会比必要的更快（而且更昂贵）。市场还必须确保代理商按时和准时报告其信息。我们考虑两个设置：首先，信息仅在截止日期之前才有价值；在第二个，随着时间的流逝，信息的价值降低。我们同时使用定理和仿真来演示这些机制。
Prediction markets are powerful tools to elicit and aggregate beliefs from strategic agents. However, in current prediction markets, agents may exhaust the social welfare by competing to be the first to update the market. We initiate the study of the trade-off between how quickly information is aggregated by the market, and how much this information costs. We design markets to aggregate timely information from strategic agents to maximize social welfare. To this end, the market must incentivize agents to invest the correct amount of effort to acquire information: quickly enough to be useful, but not faster (and more expensively) than necessary. The market also must ensure that agents report their information truthfully and on time. We consider two settings: in the first, information is only valuable before a deadline; in the second, the value of information decreases as time passes. We use both theorems and simulations to demonstrate the mechanisms.
