论文标题
与坚定的玩家共享合作的Ressource
Cooperative Ressource Sharing With Adamant Player
论文作者
论文摘要
合作游戏理论涉及玩家希望合作以提高收益的系统。但是玩家可能会以不合作性的方式选择联盟，从而导致联盟形成游戏。我们考虑了这样的游戏，与几位玩家（愿意合作）和一名坚决参与资源共享的球员（不愿合作）。在这里，玩家的策略是想要与之组成联盟的一组球员。鉴于策略概况，形成了合适的联盟分区；每个联盟的玩家最大限度地提高了集体公用事业，导致联盟之间的不合作资源共享游戏，由Shapley-Value共享了由此产生的平衡的公用事业；这些股份为联盟形成游戏中给定的策略概况定义了玩家的实用程序。我们还考虑了实用解决方案来得出无政府状态（POA）的价格。我们考虑了与对称球员和坚定球员的案例。其中我们观察到，当玩家（N）的数量超过4时，玩家更喜欢独自保持纳什均衡。相比之下，在大多数情况下，功利主义分区是大联盟。有趣的是，POA较小，坚决具有中级力量。此外，POA像O（n）一样生长。
Cooperative game theory deals with systems where players want to cooperate to improve their payoffs. But players may choose coalitions in a non-cooperative manner, leading to a coalition-formation game. We consider such a game with several players (willing to cooperate) and an adamant player (unwilling to cooperate) involved in resource-sharing. Here, the strategy of a player is the set of players with whom it wants to form a coalition. Given a strategy profile, an appropriate partition of coalitions is formed; players in each coalition maximize their collective utilities leading to a non-cooperative resource-sharing game among the coalitions, the utilities at the resulting equilibrium are shared via Shapley-value; these shares define the utilities of players for the given strategy profile in coalition-formation game. We also consider the utilitarian solution to derive the price of anarchy (PoA). We considered a case with symmetric players and an adamant player; wherein we observed that players prefer to stay alone at Nash equilibrium when the number of players (n) is more than 4. In contrast, in the majority of the cases, the utilitarian partition is grand coalition. Interestingly the PoA is smaller with an adamant player of intermediate strength. Further, PoA grows like O(n).
