论文标题
购买意见
Buying Opinions
论文作者
论文摘要
校长雇用代理商获取有关未知状态的软信息。即使代理商的学习方式和代理商发现的内容都不是可违约的，但我们表明委托人对代理商可以诚实地获取和报告哪些信息并不限制。当代理人处于中立风险中，而a）不要求学习太多，b）可以廉价地获取信息，或者c）可以面临足够大的罚款，校长可以达到第一最好的结果。我们讨论了风险规避的影响（代理商），并表征第二好的合约。
A principal hires an agent to acquire soft information about an unknown state. Even though neither how the agent learns nor what the agent discovers are contractible, we show the principal is unconstrained as to what information the agent can be induced to acquire and report honestly. When the agent is risk neutral, and a) is not asked to learn too much, b) can acquire information sufficiently cheaply, or c) can face sufficiently large penalties, the principal can attain the first-best outcome. We discuss the effect of risk aversion (on the part of the agent) and characterize the second-best contracts.
