论文标题
与部分信息发件人的贝叶斯说服的承诺顺序
Order of Commitments in Bayesian Persuasion with Partial-informed Senders
论文作者
论文摘要
发件人的承诺能力将贝叶斯说服问题与其他游戏（战略性）交流区分开。具有多个发件人的说服游戏已经在很大程度上研究了同时的承诺和信号设置。但是，许多具有多个发件人的现实世界实例具有顺序信号。在这种情况下，也可以依次做出承诺，然后发件人的承诺顺序 - 发件人信令最后提交或终于提交 - 可能会显着影响均衡的回报和策略。对于一个两源说服游戏，发件人部分意识到世界状况，我们发现必要和足够的条件来确定何时不同的承诺订单产生不同的收益概况。特别是，对于两个销售者设置，我们表明，如果有两个属性，则会出现不同的回报概况：1）两个发件人愿意在某些状态下说服接收者； 2）发件人发信号第二可以在首先提交时会构成可靠的威胁，以使其他发件人的设计信号受到限制。
The commitment power of senders distinguishes Bayesian persuasion problems from other games with (strategic) communication. Persuasion games with multiple senders have largely studied simultaneous commitment and signalling settings. However, many real-world instances with multiple senders have sequential signalling. In such contexts, commitments can also be made sequentially, and then the order of commitment by the senders -- the sender signalling last committing first or last -- could significantly impact the equilibrium payoffs and strategies. For a two-sender persuasion game where the senders are partially aware of the state of the world, we find necessary and sufficient conditions to determine when different commitment orders yield different payoff profiles. In particular, for the two-sender setting, we show that different payoff profiles arise if two properties hold: 1) the two senders are willing to collaborate in persuading the receiver in some state(s); and 2) the sender signalling second can carry out a credible threat when committing first such that the other sender's room to design signals gets constrained.
