论文标题
分散财务中的权力下放幻觉：Makerdao民意调查中的代币投票的证据
Decentralization illusion in Decentralized Finance: Evidence from tokenized voting in MakerDAO polls
论文作者
论文摘要
分散的自治组织（DAO）在分散的金融（DEFI）应用中非常受欢迎，因为它通过区块链提供了分散的治理解决方案。我们分析了制造商协议中的治理特征，其Stablecoin dai和治理令牌制造商（MKR）。为了实现这一目标，我们建立了集中治理的几个衡量标准。我们的实证分析研究了集中治理对与MKR和DAI有关的一系列因素的影响，例如金融，交易，网络和Twitter情感指标。我们的结果表明，治理集中化会影响制造商协议和投票权力的分配。这项研究的主要含义是非常存在Makerdao的集中治理，而Defi投资者在权力下放和DEFI协议的绩效之间面临权衡。这进一步有助于当代关于是否可以真正分散的Defi的辩论。 Makerdao的集中治理非常存在，而Defi投资者面临效率和权力下放之间的权衡。这进一步有助于当代关于是否可以真正分散的Defi的辩论。
Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO) is very popular in Decentralized Finance (DeFi) applications as it provides a decentralized governance solution through blockchain. We analyze the governance characteristics in the Maker protocol, its stablecoin DAI and governance token Maker (MKR). To achieve that, we establish several measurements of centralized governance. Our empirical analysis investigates the effect of centralized governance over a series of factors related to MKR and DAI, such as financial, transaction, network and twitter sentiment indicators. Our results show that governance centralization influences both the Maker protocol, and the distribution of voting power matters. The main implication of this study is that centralized governance in MakerDAO very much exists, while DeFi investors face a trade-off between decentralization and performance of a DeFi protocol. This further contributes to the contemporary debate on whether DeFi can be truly decentralized. centralized governance in MakerDAO very much exists, while DeFi investors face a trade-off between efficiency and decentralization. This further contributes to the contemporary debate on whether DeFi can be truly decentralized.
