论文标题
无先令拍卖多个商品
Auctioning Multiple Goods without Priors
论文作者
论文摘要
我考虑了一个机制设计问题，即当设计师的信息量最少时，将多个商品出售给多个竞标者。我认为设计师只知道每种商品的竞标者值的上限，并且没有其他分配信息。设计师采用了Minimax遗憾的方法。鉴于价值概况和平衡的联合分布的机制的预期遗憾定义为全部盈余与预期收入之间的差异。设计师寻求一种被称为最小值遗憾机制的机制，可以将她在所有可能的共同分布中的最糟糕的预期遗憾中最小化，而不是价值概况和所有平衡。我发现，带有随机储备的单独的第二价格拍卖是一种最小值的遗憾机制，用于一般上限。在这种机制下，设计师为每种商品进行了单独的拍卖。这些拍卖的格式是带有随机储量的第二价格拍卖。
I consider a mechanism design problem of selling multiple goods to multiple bidders when the designer has minimal amount of information. I assume that the designer only knows the upper bounds of bidders' values for each good and has no additional distributional information. The designer takes a minimax regret approach. The expected regret from a mechanism given a joint distribution over value profiles and an equilibrium is defined as the difference between the full surplus and the expected revenue. The designer seeks a mechanism, referred to as a minimax regret mechanism, that minimizes her worst-case expected regret across all possible joint distributions over value profiles and all equilibria. I find that a separate second-price auction with random reserves is a minimax regret mechanism for general upper bounds. Under this mechanism, the designer holds a separate auction for each good; the formats of these auctions are second-price auctions with random reserves.
