论文标题
迈向算法公平的实质性概念：平等机会学说的规范指导
Towards Substantive Conceptions of Algorithmic Fairness: Normative Guidance from Equal Opportunity Doctrines
论文作者
论文摘要
在这项工作中，我们使用政治哲学的平等开放性（EO）学说，使嵌入在不同算法公平概念中的规范性判断。我们对比了正式的EO方法，这些EO在离散的决策点上狭窄地关注公平竞赛，而实质性的EO学说在一生中更整体上都更加整体地观察了人们的公平生活。我们使用这种分类法来对不可能结果的道德解释，因为当人们没有公平的生活机会时，公平竞赛的不同概念与落后的概念之间的不兼容 - 外观与后退。我们使用此结果来激发算法公平性的实质性概念，并根据EO的运气 - 统一学说概述了两个合理的程序，以及Rawls的机会平等原则。
In this work we use Equal Oppportunity (EO) doctrines from political philosophy to make explicit the normative judgements embedded in different conceptions of algorithmic fairness. We contrast formal EO approaches that narrowly focus on fair contests at discrete decision points, with substantive EO doctrines that look at people's fair life chances more holistically over the course of a lifetime. We use this taxonomy to provide a moral interpretation of the impossibility results as the incompatibility between different conceptions of a fair contest -- foward-looking versus backward-looking -- when people do not have fair life chances. We use this result to motivate substantive conceptions of algorithmic fairness and outline two plausible procedures based on the luck-egalitarian doctrine of EO, and Rawls's principle of fair equality of opportunity.
