论文标题
在部分采用车辆到车辆通信时：何时应该互相警告危险？
On Partial Adoption of Vehicle-to-Vehicle Communication: When Should Cars Warn Each Other of Hazards?
论文作者
论文摘要
车辆到车辆的新兴技术（V2V）通过车辆临时网络通信有望通过允许车辆自动警告对方的道路危险来提高道路安全。但是，对其他运输信息系统的研究表明，仅通知一部分道路状况驱动因素可能会产生拥塞增加的不良影响。在V2V危害信息共享的简单（但新颖）的模型的背景下，我们询问该技术的部分采用是否会导致不良结果。在我们的模型中，驾驶员单独选择鲁ck的行为作为从其他启用V2V的汽车中收到的信息的函数，并且由此产生的总体行为会影响事故的可能性（因此，车辆网络传播的信息）。我们充分表征了该模型的游戏理论平衡。我们的模型表明，对于我们的广泛参数空间，V2V信息共享令人惊讶地增加了事故的均衡频率相对于没有V2V信息共享，并且它也可能增加了均衡的社交成本。
The emerging technology of Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication over vehicular ad hoc networks promises to improve road safety by allowing vehicles to autonomously warn each other of road hazards. However, research on other transportation information systems has shown that informing only a subset of drivers of road conditions may have a perverse effect of increasing congestion. In the context of a simple (yet novel) model of V2V hazard information sharing, we ask whether partial adoption of this technology can similarly lead to undesirable outcomes. In our model, drivers individually choose how recklessly to behave as a function of information received from other V2V-enabled cars, and the resulting aggregate behavior influences the likelihood of accidents (and thus the information propagated by the vehicular network). We fully characterize the game-theoretic equilibria of this model. Our model indicates that for a wide range of our parameter space, V2V information sharing surprisingly increases the equilibrium frequency of accidents relative to no V2V information sharing, and that it may increase equilibrium social cost as well.
