论文标题
医疗费用冲击和不完美的道德危害
Medical Bill Shock and Imperfect Moral Hazard
论文作者
论文摘要
消费者在消费护理时对医疗价格敏感，但价格信息的延迟可能会扭曲道德危害。我们研究医疗费用如何影响使用后家庭溢出支出，利用保险公司索赔处理时间的差异。预定服务后，家庭将支出增加22 \％，但随后在账单到达后将支出减少11 \％。观察到的账单效应与解决价格不确定性一致；当定价信息特别明显时，账单效果最强。使用延迟定价信息对医疗保健需求的模型表明，家庭在账单之前误解了定价信号，并且纠正这些看法每年将平均支出（中位数）减少16 \％（7 \％）。
Consumers are sensitive to medical prices when consuming care, but delays in price information may distort moral hazard. We study how medical bills affect household spillover spending following utilization, leveraging variation in insurer claim processing times. Households increase spending by 22\% after a scheduled service, but then reduce spending by 11\% after the bill arrives. Observed bill effects are consistent with resolving price uncertainty; bill effects are strongest when pricing information is particularly salient. A model of demand for healthcare with delayed pricing information suggests households misperceive pricing signals prior to bills, and that correcting these perceptions reduce average (median) spending by 16\% (7\%) annually.
